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ABSTRACT
Crispin Sartwell has argued that knowledge 
is merely true belief. The two arguments for 
this thesis are (1) from counter-examples to 
third requirements for knowledge and (2) from 
a dilemma for justification-theorists. I will 
show that the purported counter-examples are 
inconclusive because they do not reflect an 
informal pragmatic element of knowledge-
attribution. The dilemma is inconclusive, 
because one horn is easily graspable.  Further, 
I will refine Lycan’s argument that the thesis 
that knowledge is true belief is inconsistent with 
epistemic modesty.
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1.
Crispin Sartwell, among others,1 has 
argued that knowledge is merely true 
belief. Call this the TB thesis, or TB for 
short.  I will argue here that Sartwell’s two 
arguments for TB are inconclusive and, 
further, that the endorsement of TB is 
inconsistent with intellectual modesty and 
the attitude of epistemic fallibilism. This 
yields a case against TB.
I will address here the arguments for TB 
from Crispin Sartwell’s “Knowledge is 
Merely True Belief ” (1991) and “Why 
Knowledge is Merely True Belief ” (1992), 
though I believe the arguments here are 
relevant considerations for other cases for 
TB.  Sartwell’s first argument for TB comes 
from a set of examples of knowledge-
attribution, and his second argument 
proceeds as a dilemma for non-minimalist 
theories of knowledge. Sartwell frames his 
case by examples where it seems legitimate 
to reject the demand for justification, cases 
where the requirement is excessive. The 
cases can be paraphrased as follows:
Flash of insight: A is struggling 
with some math problem then 
has a ‘flash of insight’ as to the 
solution. Given that A’s been 
1  See, for example, Jakko Hintikka (1962), Alvin Gold-
man, who holds that there is a sense of knowledge that is 
true belief, (1999 and 2002), and David Martens (2005).
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working on the problem, she can’t see the proof, just the solution. She knows 
the solution.
Religious Faith: B has faith in a beneficent God. The issue of God’s existence 
and beneficence is a rationally undecidable matter, but such a God exists. B 
knows there is a loving God.
Mundane Faith: C’s son is charged with committing a grisly murder. The 
evidence against the son is piling up, but C holds to the belief in the son’s 
innocence. The son is innocent. C knows he is innocent.
Knew it All Along: P is some proposition about which D could not have any 
information before time t1. D, however, believed that p well before t1 – ever 
since t(1-n). D has the truth about p now at t1, and may legitimately claim 
that she knew it  all along. (Adapted from 1991, 160-1)
The point, Sartwell claims, is that in every case presented there are subjects who know 
because they merely have true beliefs. Justification is unnecessary. Sartwell concludes 
modestly:
Of course, even if we admit such cases, they would establish only that 
justification is not a necessary condition for knowledge; more would need to 
be said in order to do more than merely suggest that true belief is sufficient… 
I am not attempting a demonstration, but offering a plea for the suspension 
of burden of proof. (1991, 60)
The burden of proof, as Sartwell takes it now, is symmetric – the examples above 
are enough to undercut the presumptive status of the falsity of TB. The dialectical 
burdens, then, are shared on both sides of the debate. On the assumption that Sartwell 
correctly diagnoses the dialectical situation, what is necessary here are two arguments 
in response to Sarwell: one to address the undercutting that Sartwell takes his examples 
to do, and another to make the positive case against TB.  
Sartwell’s dilemma for those committed to the J-condition runs as follows. Epistemic 
justification’s normativity is either instrumental for knowledge or not. If justification is 
instrumental (namely, conceived in terms of truth-conducivity or a means to attaining 
true beliefs), then subjects pursue justification with regard to their beliefs not because 
of justification’s intrinsic worth, but as a means for the beliefs depending on those 
reasons to be true. Justification serves a pragmatic or instrumental purpose, then, for 
picking out cases of knowing or convincing others that you know. But it itself is not 
constitutive of knowledge. It is only a means for having knowledge or showing that 
you know. Sartwell reasons: “Epistemic justification is therefore in the final analysis 
only an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one” (1991, 161). Sartwell then frames his 
case that justification, so considered, cannot be part of knowledge:
[P]hilosophers (committed to the instrumental value of justification) have 
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committed themselves implicitly to the view that knowledge is merely 
true belief, and that justification is merely a criterion rather than a logically 
necessary condition for knowledge… Justification, on the present view is … 
a means by which we achieve knowledge … it provides a test of whether 
someone has knowledge, that is, whether her beliefs are true. (1992, 173-4, 
emphasis in original)
TB, then, follows. If, on the other hand, justification is not valued as merely 
instrumental to achieving true belief, then it must be valuable as some intrinsic good, 
perhaps as satisfying a demand of rationality or self-possession. Knowledge, then, is the 
achievement of two goals of cognitive life.  If so, then there is always the possibility that 
in fulfilling one goal, one may not fulfill the other. That is, one may have justification 
and not truth, and vice versa. And so, justification, pursued on its own (assuming 
fallibilism is true for justification) may lead away from truth. Sartwell notes, “[N]ow 
that we recognize two primitive epistemic values, they may well conflict” (1992, 177). 
Since there are intelligible cases where the two can fail to be “realized simultaneously”, 
the J-requirement pits two cognitive norms (justification and truth) against one another 
(1992, 180). That gives us two potentially conflicting goals of inquiry, which makes 
knowledge an “incoherent notion” (1992, 180). TB follows.  
I will first respond serially to Sartwell’s counter-examples. Second, I will argue that the 
second horn of Sartwell’s dilemma is graspable. And third, I will offer an argument that 
TB is an uncomfortable thought for anyone with fallibilist inclinations.  
2.
Sartwell is right that A knows in Flash of Insight, but he is wrong that it is a 
counter-example to the J-condition. What makes the case compelling is that A is a 
mathematician (or at least a math student) with understanding of the problem and 
training with thinking about similar issues. A isn’t, say, a toddler ignorant of math 
altogether and merely dreams up the solution when looking at his older sister’s math 
notebook. This is important, because A’s expertise here is a causal condition for A to 
have the ‘aha’ moment. In such cases, it seems plausible to say A’s belief, from A’s own 
conscious perspective, is spontaneous, but was nevertheless a consequence of some set 
of unconscious inferences.2 A, later, may be able to reconstruct how she saw the solution 
by talking about the things she was committed to and that some connection dawned 
for her.  Further, the belief may be non-doxastically justified. A may intuitively see that 
some proposition is right, but not now have the means to prove it correct. If A’s belief 
is based on that intuition, it seems the belief could be justified. So far, the case with A 
is consistent with traditional theories of knowledge.
The cases with B, C, and D just don’t seem like cases of knowledge, so I don’t see how 
they are counter-examples. Here’s an analogy why. Let Carl go to Las Vegas. Carl loves 
2  Sartwell, importantly, has what seems an inferential requirement for belief-formation, as he is clear that guesses are 
not beliefs (1991, 159).
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the number three. Carl plays Keno, and bets his house on three. He fully believes 
that three will win. He does so out of his love for or faith in three and three’s power. 
Three ends up winning, but Carl didn’t know that three would come up. Carl’s reasons 
were terrible, and that seems to defeat his claim that he knows. That is, justification 
can show others that you know not just by showing them that the belief is true (as 
Sartwell correctly argues), but giving justifications can show that you know in that you 
understand how it is that what you believe is true. If Carl has no plausible understanding 
of how 3 would win, he doesn’t know that it would, even if he was right. That seems 
intuitive enough.
We might, however, let Carl get away with saying he knew that three would come up. 
We would do so not because he would be right, but because it would be conversationally 
costly to correct him. Knowledge attributions like these have informalities because we 
don’t want to get too technical or snippy with people when it doesn’t matter one way or 
the other whether or not we allow them to claim they knew. With Carl and gambling, 
only the truth matters for the payout. The pit boss isn’t going to quibble that we’re 
stretching the meaning of ‘knows’ when we allow Carl to say he knew. He will just 
count out the chips. And the same (at least for the examples) goes for the B, the theist, 
C, the trusting parent, and D, who “knew it all along.” When it’s only the truth that 
counts, we don’t haggle over the further messy details of knowledge-attribution. In 
these cases, we may be pragmatically warranted in attributing knowledge, despite the 
fact that it’s false that the people in these cases actually know. Here, the thought is that, 
all things considered, it may be reasonable to let some people get away with claiming 
they know when they did, in fact, not know. The truth of such claims is most certainly 
important to us, but there may be cases where that value can be trumped by something 
of greater value – perhaps a friendship, maintaining good will, and in the case of the 
card dealer, keeping his job.
But change the case where it is important that we have justification, not just truth. Let’s 
have S3, the trusting parent, claiming that the son is innocent. In one context, say as 
sympathetic friends, we may attribute knowledge to C. We may share C’s confidence in 
the son, and by this, we could reasonably attribute knowledge to C. For us and for the 
parent, only his being innocent is important. But in another context, say as the parents 
of the murder victim or members of a jury, we would want also to know why C believes 
the son’s innocent. Sartwell, here, makes the argument that these considerations make 
justification instrumental in legitimating knowledge-claims, not in constituting them. 
Surely, the instrumentality is right, but it doesn’t follow that they aren’t constitutive. 
Precisely because if C believes on the basis of terrible reasons (e.g., on the basis of some 
clearly irrelevant piece of evidence or on the basis of mere wishful thinking), we would 
not attribute knowledge to C because C did not know.3 And often, if we aren’t C’s 
friends or family, we’ll be more willing to pay the costs for saying what’s true.
It has been widely noted that the conditions for warranted knowledge-attribution 
change with context, and here, standards for allowable knowledge-attribution change 
according to what’s at stake. In cases where, once the belief is true, justification is 
3  Duncan Pritchard also pushes this terrible reasons line in 2004, 110. 
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beside the point from our interests, it is informally allowable for people to attribute 
knowledge to people without justifying reasons. But that does not make those 
attributions strictly correct. Go back to Carl. The Keno dealer, once it’s clear that Carl 
has won, can reasonably let Carl claim that he knew three would win. That’s because 
he has no real reason (beyond the technical reason) to correct him. But Carl bet the 
house. Surely, say, Carl’s wife would want more than the fact that he won to call it a 
case of knowledge. The point here is that in the cases Sartwell proposes, we are tempted 
to conflate the pragmatics of knowledge-attribution with the semantics of knowledge 
conditions.4 
So the story with S2 would go that so long as the God in question isn’t an evidentialist 
and the conditions for successful belief in Him aren’t evidential in nature, then it would 
seem reasonable to attribute knowledge to B. But if the evidence is also important, 
then B couldn’t be reasonably said to know. Take D, who ‘knew it all along’ also. We 
generally allow people to attribute knowledge in hindsight to themselves; however, it 
is clear that a good deal of such knowledge-attributions are actually distortions of the 
epistemic situation. There is a demonstrable tendency for subjects to exhibit what is 
called ‘hindsight bias’ on behalf of their present epistemically better-off beliefs when 
assessing their previous beliefs: they systematically attribute these evidentially better off 
views to themselves in the past, so they, even when they had no idea at the time, assess 
themselves as having ‘known it all along.’5 Consequently, the varieties of knowledge-
attribution and their inherent distortions require of us a measure of tolerance for 
analytically incorrect but contextually appropriate claims (in these cases, just having 
true belief ) to knowledge.
  
The point here is that Sartwell’s counter-examples are cases where, if all we care about 
is the truth of the beliefs in question, we don’t bother about the details of justification 
for knowledge-attribution. C’s sympathetic friends and Carl’s Keno dealer don’t correct 
these cases because it’s costly to do so. In cases where the costs of wrong future outcome 
outweigh the conversational costs of correction (the jury and Carl’s wife), it is reasonable 
to correct those attributions. Sartwell is right that there is a pragmatic element to this 
aspect of knowledge attribution, but he’s wrong that it counts in his favor.
3.
The second argument for minimalism is Sartwell’s dilemma. The first horn of the 
dilemma, I think, is right – that if we think justification is merely statistical or modal, 
then the J-condition is either merely internal to the T-condition or entirely detachable 
from knowledge. I think that horn is sharp, and I will leave defenses of externalism to 
externalists.6 But Sartwell is wrong about the second horn. He argues that because
4  See LeMorvan (2002,154-5) for a similar argument that the pragmatics-semantics distinction is not respected by 
the Sartwell counter-examples.
5  See Frischhoff (2007) and  Mazzoni and Vannucci (2007) for reviews of the various distortions possible in the 
general class of ‘hindsight bias.’ Thanks to Rachel L. Phillips for this point. 
6  See LeMorvan 2002 for an account of the instrumentality of justification as still intrinsic to knowledge and Hof-
man’s response in 2005.
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there are “two primitive epistemic values,” they “may well conflict” (1992, 177). He 
reasons as follows:
[I]f justification is itself proposed as an intrinsic goal (a demand for reason, 
for example), then knowledge is an incoherent notion. It gives us two goals 
for inquiry, which cannot always be realized simultaneously. (1992, 180)
But now the question is how knowledge is incoherent when two goals of cognitive life 
may not always be mutually instantiable? We want to have the truth and have it in the 
right way, and there may be cases when we have one or the other but not both. How 
does that make knowledge inconsistent, much less incoherent? A few analogies can 
help clarify this. Being a good sport, I think, requires the joint successes of playing 
well and playing by the rules. But, surely, one might play better by bending the rules 
sometimes.  It may also be possible to play by the rules, but nevertheless play horribly. 
The detachability of these two goals of being a good sport from each other does not 
make the concept of being a good sport incoherent. Rather, that the two are not always 
mutually instantiable helps explain why there are so few good sports and correlately 
why being a good sport is something one has to really work hard to be. Another 
analogy: Living well requires that we enjoy ourselves and be moral, but sometimes it’s a 
drag to do the right thing. The fact that two goals of a good life are separable and may 
not be always jointly instantiable does not make the goal of a good life incoherent.7 
This tenuousness, instead, helps make intelligible what the successes are in living well, 
and how hard it can be sometimes to balance these goods. As a corollary, with inquiry 
as the pursuit of knowledge, the idea that one can have justification but not truth is 
the central thought behind fallibilism: that a subject may be justified in a belief but not 
correct. How else might fallibilism be intelligible unless the two notions were not co-
extensive? But when one knows, one has satisfied two demands of cognitive life: have 
the truth and be rational. There are two points in the offing here. First is that the fact 
that some notion may have two necessary conditions that are not co-extensive does not 
make that notion incoherent. The second is that the fact of non-coextensive necessary 
conditions for being a good sport, living well, and knowing, can help explain why these 
are real achievements.  So the second horn of Sartwell’s dilemma is not sharp at all.
4.
I will close here by refining what I take to be the most direct case against the TB thesis. 
Holding TB commits subjects to an attitude of infallibility with regard to their beliefs. 
William Lycan (1994) has responded to Sartwell’s position by pointing to its being 
self-refuting. Though Lycan’s argument is on the right track, it is incomplete.8 Instead 
of showing that TB is self-refuting, the argument shows that a commitment to TB is 
inconsistent with intellectual modesty or fallibilism. Lycan’s argument runs:
7  In fact, a tu quoque seems reasonable here, since Sartwell’s notion of justification would (if internal to the T-condi-
tion) not be able to account for justified but widespread false beliefs (Latus 2000, 38). That conception of justification 
seems positively incoherent.
8  Lycan’s argument has been criticized by Skidmore (1997, 124), LeMorvan (2002, 165) and Martens (2006, 16)
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Sartwell believes TB.(1) 
TB is true (assumed for (2) reductio).
If TB is true, then (if some S believes p and p is true, then S knows that (3) 
p).
If (1) and (2), then Sartwell knows TB.  (3)(4) 
Sartwell knows TB. (1, 2, 4)(5) 
If any subject S believes p and S is aware that S believes p, then  S (6) 
believes that S believes p truly.
Sartwell is aware that he believes TB.(7) 
Sartwell believes that he believes TB truly. (1, 6, 4)(8) 
If any subject S believes p and S knows that q is equivalent to p by (9) 
analysis, then S believes q. (substitutivity of known analytic entailments 
in belief-contexts)
(10) Sartwell believes he knows TB.
Lycan holds we should balk at (10), since it is highly unlikely that anyone knows highly 
controversial philosophical claims to be true, and it is unlikely that serious philosophers 
are so arrogant to think they are exceptions. The argument generalizes to yield:
(11) For any proposition p that Sartwell believes and is aware he believes, 
Sartwell believes he knows p.
(11) is something we should definitely balk at, since it entails that we eschew all 
intellectual modesty. Any belief Sartwell has, no matter how fleeting or flighty is one 
that he, on TB and his belief the TB is true, must take himself to know. Every belief. 
That doesn’t seem right. Lycan reasons, then, that we should reject (11). So we should 
reject (2) by reductio.  
The problem is that the reductio is incomplete, because (2) is introduced into an already 
inconsistent set. What makes (11) false is the following premise:
(12) Sartwell has at least one belief that he is aware he has but he does not 
believe is a case of knowledge.
The problem is that (1), (3), (6), (9), and (12) are already inconsistent. We can see this 
because (11) follows from (1), (3), (6) and (9) without the need of introducing (2). 
Note that the only inference that (2) plays a role in is to (5), but (5) is a dead end in 
the proof.  The trouble, then, is that the proof can’t be a reductio of (2), because the set 
of premisses it’s introduced into is already inconsistent.
The Lycan self-refutation argument isn’t successful. However a weaker conclusion is 
still right – namely that (1), (3), (6), (9), and (12) are inconsistent. By this, we have a 
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reason to reject (1). Neither Sartwell nor anyone else, for that matter, can believe TB 
and remain epistemically modest. Given that we are and ought to be epistemically 
modest, even about TB, we cannot be committed to TB. Unless the argument for 
TB is coupled with an argument against epistemic modesty, we cannot maintain a 
commitment to it. The argument extends to TB’s falsity as follows. It is a reasonable 
presumption behind epistemology that getting clearer about the concept of knowledge 
would make us epistemically less vicious. Certainly, if we have the right conception of 
knowledge, we shouldn’t be made by that conception more vicious. A further thought 
is that having the right conception of knowledge should improve and not make worse 
our knowledge-assessments. TB is a conception of knowledge, and believing it (with the 
first step in the reductio above) makes us epistemically vicious. Further, given that if we 
believe TB, we will attribute knowledge to ourselves more widely than we would if we 
required justification, TB will induce a wide variety of false knowledge-attributions (as 
first-personal knowledge attribution would be co-extensive with first-personal belief-
attribution), even on its own analysis. TB, then, cannot be true of knowledge.
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